From: U.S. Army. European Command. Intelligence Division.
Wartime activities of the German diplomatic and military services during World War II
Sonderfuehrer (Z) Wolgang BLAUM, alias BAUMANN, Referat II, KO Spanien.
Obst/Lt Paul FUCHS, Nest Biarritz
Hermann AMENDE, agent of Referat I KO Spanien.
Referat II KO Spain
During the war, Spain was the scene of numerous acts of sabotage committed by Germans and agents of the Germans against Allied shipping and military installations. In addition, the Iberian Peninsula was used as a base from which agents with a wide variety of missions were sent to many parts of the globe. This report is a study of the organization responsible for all these activities.
b. History and Organization of Referat II, KO Spain.
Abwehr II’s first representative in Spain, sent there early in 1940, was Sonderfuehrer KRUEGER. KRUEGER was instructed to set up an office in Madrid and to study conditions in general as well as possibilities for II operations in Spain. At the time; headquarters in Berlin had not yet devised a plan for carrying out its insurrection and minority program (J – work) in Spain. No sabotage activities were planned, principally because S and J were still separate departments of Abwehr II, and both KRUEGER and BLAUM who went to Spain in March 1940, were sent there on orders of the J section.
Upon his arrival in Madrid, BLAUM reported to Freg. Kptn. LENZ, CO of KP Spanien. BLAUM was told that his first mission was to make contacts of possible future value. Permission for BLAUM to remain in Spain was obtained by the German Embassy, where he was registered as an employee. Later the entire staff of Referat II was incorporated into the Embassy as a section of KO Spain, Thus LENZ became KRUEGER’s and BLAUM’s superior. Although matters of II interest were settled with Abwehr II in Berlin, LENZ still influenced II operations, since allgeneral policies had to be approved by him.
In 1941 KRUEGER was transferred to Tangier,where he was put in charge of a small independent KO organization. Major RUDOLF was appointed the new head of II in Spain. The failure of most of the projects initiated under RUDOLF was largely due to his inexperience and lack of initiative.
The appointment of Friedrich HUMMEL, a well known swimmer, to succeed RUDOLF in 1943 paved the way of the most successful period II KO Spain’s history. Missions were completed against Gibraltar, Allied orange freighters, and after Italy’s surrender, Italian vessels in Spanish harbors. A «cease action» order was received from Berlin in March 1944, and HUMMEL was recalled for more important assignments as head of the Leitstelle II West, FA.
The new chief of Referat II, Hptm. Nauman zu KOENIGSBRUECK, was handcuffed by the order prohibiting S-operations in Spain. He had only begun work on an R – organization (Rueckzugs Organisation – withdrawal plan) when he was ordered to return to Germany. In February 1945, BLAUM was also recalled, and Referat II’s remaining activities were entrusted to Werner SCHULZ,a new and and inexperienced man from Berlin.
Following is a list of all personnel assigned to KO Spanien from 1940 , through March 1945:
1940 – Chief, Hans KRUEGER, Sonderfuehrer (Z)
Wolfgang BLAUM, Pionier alias Friedrich BAUMANN
Franz ZIMMERMANN, V-Mann
1941 – Chief, RUDOLF, Hptn alias RUDOLPH
Wolfgang BLAUM, Gefr
Joseph WABER, Gefr
Heinrich SCHOMMER, Uffz (killed in Russia)
Frl Charlotte HILGERT, secretary
Franz ZIMMERMANN, employe
1942 – Chief, Friedrich HUMMEL, O/Lt
Wolfgang BLAUM, Gefr
Hans RICHTER alias RITTER, employe
Joseph WABER, Gefr
Franz ZIMMERMANN, employe (died 1942)
Victor ANTE, Gefr alias HOFFMANN
Frl Guntrud HEISE, secretary
Frl Lilo NIEMANN alias NEHRKORN, secretary
1943 – Chief, Friedrich HUMMEL, Hptm
to Mar 44 Wolfgang BLAUM, Gefr
Hans RICHTER, Pvt
Joseph. WABER, O/Gefr
Victor ANTE, Gefr . –
Fritz ROSSBUND, Gefr
Alfred STRICKNER, Uffz
Frl Lore DAUMER, secretary
Frl Charlotte KRIESCH, secretary
Karl KAMPEN, Lt (temp) (killed Nov 43)
Mar 44-Chief, Guenther NAUMANN zu KOENIGSBRUECK, Hptm
to Dec 44 Wolfgang BLAUM, Uffz, Sonderfuehrer (Z)
Joseph WABER, Uffz
Fritz ROSSBUND, Gefr
Frl Guntrud HEISE, secretary
Jan 45- Chief, Wolfgang BLAUM
Werner SCHULZ, Pvt.
Fritz ROSSBUND, Gefr
Frl Guntrud HEISE, secretary
c. Referat II, KO Spain, At Work
Orders from Berlin
No specific orders concerning the nature of sabotage work were ever given by Berlin headquarters, which merely issued statements of general policy. Changes in policy were frequently necessitated by political or military reverses, the exact nature of which were unknown to the lower echelons. One rule, however, was always emphasized: all sabotage against Allied shipping was to be timed so that the explosion would occur outside Spanish territorial waters, that Spanish neutrality would never be openly violated, and that no proof of German origin would be found at the scene of the sabota.ge. (Proof of German complicity in the explosion of an orange ship at Valencia brought a succession of reprimands from the Foreign Office, the High Command, and Spanish authorities, directed against Abwehr II in Berlin and passed down to HUMMEL in Madrid,)
Only one exception was allowed to this regulation. At the last minute, permission was granted to sabotage Italian ships in Spanish harbors, but again it was emphasized that no clue of German, complicity be found, and that, should the Spanish Government make an official protest, blame be placed on the Italian crews. A last and definite order from Berlin was received in early 1944, prohibiting all S-operations in Spain and ordering the destruction or removal of all remaining S-materials.
Origin of Sabotage Materials
Whenever possible, II KO Spanien used British sabotage equipment. The reason for this was twofold: (a) British material was far superior to, as well as more reliable and safer to handle then, the German equivalent; (b) Its use also prevented detection of German origin in case an action was prematurely discovered. This equipment, sent from BERLIN under diplomatic privileges, had been captured In France, either after the British withdrawal of 1940 or from underground forces, to whom great quantities had been parachuted by the Allies.
Efficiency of Abwehr II
Personnel of Abwehr II was generally ill-suited for its job, according to BLAUM and AMENDE. In most cases tho KOs were headed by old reserve officers, intent on keeping their position and rank but lacking intelligence training and knowledge of the country to which they were assigned. Strict adherence to the rigid military hierarchy prevented abler, more experienced subordinates from making their voices heard in the operations of the KOs. As a result, plans were always vague, specific operations had little chance of success, and throughout the war the slogan in Berlin remained, «Something must be done, no matter what.» Abwehr II was characterized by a marked tendency to claim tremendou successes and to report constant activity, even when nothing was going on.
The activities of Abwehr II in Spain fall into three separate phases:
First phase, 1940-1941: No large-scale sabotage. Several unsuccessful missions against Gibraltar (see Annex I) and Allied shipping (see Annex II). Important activity in connection with J-work, with Spain used as an intermediary (see Annex IV).
Second phase, 1942-1943: Activity in many fields, especially against Gibraltar (see Annex I) and allied shipping (Annex II),
Third phase, 1944 to end of war: All S-activitj.es prohibited by Berlin, Drafting of plans for R-activities (Rueckzugsorganisation). II staff reduced at beginning of 1945.
In late 1942, KO Spain began to fear an Allied invasion of Spain. This attitude, based in part on persistent reports from Berlin pointing to the probability of Allied landings in Spain, prevailed throughout 1943. Shortly after the Allied invasion of North Africa, orders were received to build up an R-organization in the Iberian Peninsula. Referat II’s part in the project consisted of burying small quantities of S-materials in south and south east Spain, where the invasion was anticipated. To avoid possible indiscretions, only the German staff was allowed to participate in the burying parties. The plan was to send agents across the front lines or to parachute them in the vicinity of hidden dumps. Thus future Abwehr missions, once arrived behind enemy lines, would be assured of adequate supplies. Approximately thirty small crates were buried at a depth of about twelve inches, at locations easily accessible and close to future sabotage targets. These crates were corrosion-proof and contained five to ten charges of different types and sizes, such as incendiaries, demolitions and camouflage coal, all of British origin. .Instructions for use were attached to each charge. The locations of the dumps’were described in great detail by a series of charts and photographs, of which three sets were made. One set was kept at II headquarters in Berlin, one sent to Ast Paris, and one to the Iberia Abwehr Troop, a unit set up at the same as the R-organization for employment in the event of an Allied invasion of the Peninsula. None of the charts or photographs remained in Spain. The three existing sets were destroyed before the end of the war. The copy in Paris disappeared in 1944, coincident with the rumored desertion of a member of the II staff of Ast Paris.
Also in line with the R-organization, Referat II began in late 1943 to train ten to fifteen Spaniards in the handling of S-materials. These men were to be left behind enemy lines. However, when all S-operations in Spain were discontinued on orders from Berlin in early 1944, this plan had to be abandoned. Of the participants in the sabotage course, BLAUM remembers Francisco BORJABAD, the recruiting agent, and Ricardo GUSAETA / ZUSAETA / SUSAETA and Emilio DIAZ, both students. Since the training had to be suspended in its early stages, the Spanish agents never received any sabotage materials.
KO Spain envisioned another possibility for R-work in the support of a clandestine right-wing Falange group led by Narciso PERALES, one of the earliest Falangists and a sincere idealist. PERALES’ political activities were of little interest to Abwehr II, which, despite its new designation, Mil Amt D, had remained a purely military organization.
It was suggested to Berlin, however, that a demonstration of good will that 20,000 Pesetas be alloted to PERALES’ organization for its propaganda program. PERALES and his followers were in opposition to FRANCO’s foreign policy, which in their opinion was becoming increasingly favorable to the Allies. PERALES was a fanatic Catholic, a rabid opponent of Communism and a thorough Germanophile.
PERALES’ group consisted of old Falangists who had supposedly remained honest and had not joined in on the frequent attempts by Falange leaders to enrich themselves. They considered themselves the Falange autentica as opposed to the regular Falange founded by PRIMO DE RIVERA.
PERALES, known as a very secretive person, never divulged more than vague information regarding the composition of his organization. Moreover, it was felt by KO Spain that his tremendous enthusiasm caused him to exagerate the importance of his group. He claimed that such military leaders as General YOGUE (misspelling for YAGÜE) and MUNEZ GRANDE (misspelling for MUÑOZ GRANDES) supported his movement, and that even SERRANO SUÑER was sympathetic to his cause. It was considered doubtful, however, whether these important figures would openly ally themselves with France’s enemies.
Despite suspicions of wishful thinking on the part of PERALES, Referat II was agreed that he could be of value in R-operations in the event that FRANCO should break off diplomatic relations with Germany, or that Spain should be invaded by the Allies. In July 1944 a plan for making use of PERALES was submitted to Berlin. Since approval was not immediately forthcoming and PERALES needed time to round up and brief his collaborators little progress was made in 1944. The project was still in its preliminary states when BLAUM left Spain in February 1945. The first step of this plan was to set up a W/T net which would assure permanent contact with PERALES after a break between Germany and Spain. This net would have been the basis for future II work. The remainder of the plan, including S-training, could not be carried out because of the blanket order prohibiting all S-activities was still in effect. Three W/T stations were to be established at Madrid, Barcelona and Sevilla. The procurement of personnel and appropriate sites for the stations were entrusted to Fernando ALZAGA, head of the anti-communist department of the Falange information service. It had also been decided to turn over to PERALES, a set of the documents revealing the location of S-deposits mentioned above. Since the documeib were not available in Spain, a set was requisitioned from Berlin. They were to be given to PERALES just before the contemplated diplomatic rupture or invasion. In February 1945, this had not been done.
d. Cooperation With Other Sections of KO Spain.
Only a minimum of news and opinion were exchanged between Referat II and the other sub-sections. Information of I and III interest which was gathered along with II material was merely passed on to the interested sections. There were, however, some exceptions to this policy.
In Sevilla, Capt Antonio OJEDA and Patricio DREXEL / DIEPEL, neither of whom were connected with II, were used in sabotage activities. OJEDA, a member of the Spanish intelligence service, volunteered information on maritime traffic to and from Gibraltar. Most of his reports came through Referat I. DIEPEL, a German resident of SEVILLA, contributed reports on the internal political situation, police records, etc., some of which were used by III.
Referat II obtained an especially valuable item of information for I/TLw through DIEPEL. A Spanish air force colonel supplied a complete description of a US four-engined bomber. which had made an emergency landingin southern Spain. Various technical manuals were included in the report. At the time (summer 1943), the Abwehr was looking for such material, and was anxious to obtain data on radar equipment, which was supplied in this report.
Some III F functions were taken over by the II office after all S-operations had been forbidden by Berlin. Perfecto BRIOSO, a Falange information service agent, had contacted BALDWIN, of the US Embassy. BRIOSO, who had been engaged by the Spanish III F service, had offered his services to the II office without the knowledge of III F. Thus BLAUM was able to learn what questions BALDWIN had asked BRIOSO and what cover answers BRIOSO had been furnished by his own intelligence service. In one case, when BALDWIN screened a number of Germans with BRIOSO’s aid, BRIOSO’s cover answers were supplied by the II office. BRIOSO’s activities came to an end when Spain decided to discontinue III connections with the U.S. Embassy and BRIOSO refused to carry on without the shield of his own organization.
Enrique ZABALA, a Spanish friend of a member of the II staff, claimed to have established III F contacts with the British Embassy through certain left-wing and anarchist circles, who in turn claimed to know VARELA, a Spaniard in the service of the British. KO Spain had always been extremely interested in the results of Allied measures to gain support of Spanish leftist parties. ZABALA, however, was arrested by the Spanish police and admitted having worked as a III F agent for the Germans.
Another III F man, FERNANDES FERNANDEZ, was engaged by Referat II. A Spanish police agent in Sevilla, FERNANDEZ worked in a III F capacity with the British Consulate, supplying British intelligence with lists of arrivals and departures of aliens. He had also been asked to investigate suspect German agents. Necessary answers, were, of course, supplied by the II office.
e. Co-operation of Spanish Officials and Firms.
The Spanish secret police had very close ties with the Abwehr and SD. The foreign branch of the Falange submitted reports of various kinds to the Abwehr. Carlos PEREYRA, an agent for the Mexican motion picture industry in Madrid, worked as a liaison agent between the Abwehr and Falange.
ALCAZAR DE VELASCO, a Spanish agent who had been in England as Abwehr businessman was taken to Germany by OBERBEIL in August 1944.
One source of information in the Falange was handled by SS Sturmbannfuehrer MOSIG of RSHA Referat IV B.
Franco’s ex-foreign minister, Ramon SUÑER, transmitted to SCHELLENBERG incidental items of intelligence.
f. Liaison With Spanish Officials.
FUCHS, who was stationed at Biarritz for two years, had close contact to the following persons belonging to the Comandancia Militar de la Frontera Norte de España:
(1) Col Julio ORTEGA–TERCERO; handled transit and exit permits.
(2) Major IBANEZ; operated his own net of agents and was suspected of working for both the Germans and Allies.
(3) Capt LINARES; supposedly worked for the British in conjunction with the Family de la SOTA in Biarritz.
(4) Capt SANCHEZ.
Fuchs was also introduced to the following members of the Spanish Intelligence Service:
(1) Lt Col CABANILLAS from Madrid.
(2) Maj GOYCORETA.
FUCHS was acquainted with the following named subjects who worked for the different sections, some pro-German and some pro-Allied:
(1)The Count of ANDES.
(2) The Duke of AGUILAR
(3) The Family de la SOTA.
As these persons were residing at Biarritz between 1942 and 1944.
g. Co-operation Between Spanish Officials and German Intelligence Agencies.
Kapitaen LENZ, head of the KO Spain was able to maintain close relations with the Spanish Army due to his activities in the Civil War.
GIESE was introduced to the chief agent of the Spanish counterintelligence in La Coruña by a letter which he received from Lt Col HUSTON, chief of the forementioned organization. Thus GIESE was able to receive reports of the agents maintained aboard Spanish ships by the Falange and by Spanish intelligence.
h. Relations with Spanish Authorities.
ROHRSCHEIDT, head of Abwehr III in Spain, worked tery closely with Lt Col JUSTE of the Spanish Intelligence Service. One part of the GIS, possibly Amt IV, was in close contact with the Camisas Cruzadas ( error: it didn’t exist such a group or name. The group alluded was surely the so called Camisas Viejas), a small group in the Falange.
i. GIS Connections with the Spanish Intelligence Service.
Collaboration between the Abwehr and the Spanish IS were very close. CARBE and SANCHEZ RUBIO worked together at Algericas. After the expulsion of the Germans from that area SANCHEZ RUBIO reported activities in Gibraltar directly to the KO in Madrid.
KUEHLENTHAL made daily visits to the SIS office in MADRID. He conferred mainly with Gen MARTINEZ DE CAMPAS and Lt Col PARDO, In autumn 1940, CANARIS held discussions WITH FRANCO concerning an attack upon Gibraltar.
j. Abwehr Spain – Cooperation Between German and Spanish I S. Nest Algericas (error for Algeciras)
The chief of the Nest Algericas (error for Algeciras) was CARBE, alias DON ALBERTO, who was concerned primarily with the Gibraltar area and was assisted by Kapt KELLER, alias BODEGA. KURRER believed that operations were conducted mainly by recruiting agents from among the thousands of Spanish workmen who lived in Algericas and commuted to Gibraltar. CARBE also handled the negotiations with local Spanish authorities for the installation of infra-red equipment across the Straits of Gibraltar for the purpose of recording ship movements through the Straits. At one time these installations were destroyed, possibly by Allied agents. CARBE was assisted in discovering the strength and armaments of Gibraltar by It Col SANCHEZ RUBIO of the SIS. This station, KURRER believes, was closed sometime in 1 044 because of pressure on Spain by the United Stites and Great Britain.
The following persons were considered by AMENDE to be key personalities in the chain of numerous groups and organizations linked with either KO Spain or the SIS:
Padre LANG (Pater Agostin Maria LANGE).
(For more detailed information see «Personalities»).
AMENDE says that there were relations between Referat II and the SIS. Any project undertaken by Referat II was of necessity kept secret from the German Embassy itself. All sabotage actions on Spanish soil were covered to prevent any proof that these were German inspired. Spanish agents were recruited without the help of any official Spanish government agencies, and sabotage operations were carried on independently of anyother organization in Spain, Spanish or otherwise. Only in planning the R-net against a possible Allied invasion of Spain, did BLAUM recruit the aid of PERALES and his followers.
According to AMENDE it should be possible to establish a net of informants knowledgeable on the activities of the remaining elements of the GIS in Spain. Some of these potential elements were considered neutral, others pro-Allied, and other pro-German. AMENDE is not sure of their exact sumpathies. Nevertheless, he suggests the following as a possile plan of procedure:
First contact with Spaniards across the border from Cerbere might be established with the chief of the frontier police of Port-Ban (error instead of Port-Bou), a certain
Mariano LOPEZ VINAULES (error for LOPEZ VIÑUALES )and his assistant SOL could serve as liaison man with agents whose headquarters are in France, bearers of correspondence, and could be helpful in granting entrance and frontier crossing permits.
VINAULES then, is the man to contact RUIZ DE VALLE and AMABLE in Figueras. The latter two are members of the SIS, good friends of AMENDE with leads into Barcelona, and are likely to be cooperative. In Barcelona,MORENA (error for MORENO) BRAVO is the key, informant on any subject concerning:
(1) Former members and activities concerning German Consulates.
(2) Abwehr Stelle Barcelona.
(3) Plans and projects of former Referat II, KO Spain.
(4) Shipping during the war.
(5) Dispatching of agents.
(6) The Spanish Intelligence Service.
(7) Leads into Madrid.
From MORENO BRAVO the link to CASANAS may be established. CASANAS, well known in Spanish politics since 1937 has connections with:
(1) Clique of general officers surrounding FRANCO.
(2) Falange and minor parties with similar policies.
(3) Spanish police (for check on aliens and registers
(4) Civil service throughout Spain.
(5) Falange police and SIS in Spanish Morocco, and possibly South America.
(6) SERRANO SUÑER and his immediate environnement (now eclipsed in Oviedo) and has acquaintance with:
(1) LICIMADA JUANA (Luis Ma de Juana?) (member of SIS – alien registration)
(2) AGUILLO (Naval intelligence)
(3) BOMBIN (SIS and Falange police)
(4) Emilio LANG (and through him with former Referat I, KO Spain).
Emilio LANG, the next man in the chain, may be consulted with the purpose of obtaining all information concerning the GIS, especially recent activities of what remained of KO Spain. LANG may also be able to contact Padre LANGE in Bilbao. Padre LANGE, another key man, would be available or connections with:
(1) Church of Spain (church heads in Madrid).
(3) GIS and its past activities in Ireland and South America.
(4) The Basques and his intimate knowledge of conditions in North Spain.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION
Sonderfuehrer (Z) Wolfgang BLAUM, Referat II, KO Spain.
Obslt Paul FUCHS, Nest Biarritz
Hermann AMENDE, Agent of Referat I, KO Spain.
Auction of looted Old Masters in Barcelona.
See docs. Catalogue Reference:T/209/9, National Archives, Kew:
«(…) Ministry of Information
22nd March, 1945
On the 2nd October, you wrote to the Director General regarding the import of looted works of art into neutral countries, and, in particular, the Iberian Peninsula, As stated by Mr. McCann in his letter to you of the 18th October, we wrote to our Press Attaches in Spain, asking them to let us know if any information came their way, and we have now received from our Press Attache in Barcelona a list of Old Masters now being offered for sale privately in that city. We are unable to state whether they have been in Spain for some time or have been recently imported, but the list may be of some interest to you.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,
Joan Lynam, Spanish Section.
(To) The Hon. Secretary, British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives and Other Material in Enemy Hands, Parliament Square House. Parliament Street, S.W 1.
Una tabla – (Renacimiento) Escuela Italiana,
siglo XV, representa La Adoración de los Reyes
Magos – sus dimensiones son de 1,10 de alta
por 0,80 de ancha, se pide en venta 1.750.000
Una tabla – Atribuida a Rafael Sancio -siglo XV,
y XVI, representa El Pasmo de Sicilia – sus
dimensiones son de 0,50 de alta por 0,32 de
ancha, se pide en venta 350. 000
Una tabla – Atribuida a Rubens -siglo XVI,
representa La Virgen, el Niño y San Juanín-
sus dimensiones son de 0,27 de alta por 0,22
de ancha, se pide en venta 30. 000
Una tabla -Atribuida a Goya- siglo XVIII,
representa el retrato de un señor de la época –
sus dimensiones son de 0,21 de alta por 0,20
de ancha, se pide en venta 25.000
Un lienzo -Atribuido a Ticiano- siglo XV, y XVI,
representa la Imagen de Jesucristo, atado a la
Columna- sus dimensiones son de 0,62 de alto
por 0,55 de ancho, se pide en venta 750.000
Un lienzo – Atribuido a Ribera (El Españoleto)
-siglo XV, y XVI, representa un Santo Eremita, –
sus dimensiones son de 0,62 de alto por 0,55
de ancho, se pide en venta 1.500.000
Un lienzo – Atribuido a Alenza -siglo XIX, representa
el retrato de una mujer- sus dimensiones son de
0,60 de alto por 0,50 de ancho, se pide en venta 50.000
Un lienzo – Atribuido a Federico Madrazo -siglo XIX,
representa el retrato de una joven de la época- sus
dimensiones son de 0,75 de alto por 0,45 de ancho,
se pide en venta 50.000
Un lienzo – Atribuido a Francisco Herrera (padre) – siglo
XV, y XVI, representa el retrato de un cardenal- sus
dimensiones son de 1 metro de alto por 0,85 de ancho,
se pide en venta 750.000
Un lienzo -Atribuido a Berruguete (padre) – siglo XV, y
XVI, representa el busto de la Virgen- sus dimensiones
son de 0,31 de alto por 0,22 de ancho, se pide en venta 75.000
Un cobre -Atribuido a Greco – siglo XVI,, representa un
anciano y un Ángel -sus dimensiones son de 0,19 de alto
por 0,14 de ancho, se pide en venta 75.000
Dos cobres – Atribuidos a Ticiano -siglo XV, representa dos
Romanos-, sus dimensiones son de 0,17 de altos por 0,13
de anchos, se pide en venta 750.000
Dos cobres -Atribuidos a la época de Renacimiento- siglo XV,
los dos son también iguales de tamaño, el uno representa
El Paraiso Terrenal y el otro La Torre de Babel – sus dimensiones
son de 0,19 de alto por 0,11 de ancho, se pide en venta 40.000
ACRONYMS AND TERMS
2ième Bureau: Deuxième Bureau (France’s external military intelligence agency)
A.E.M: American Embassy in Madrid.
Abteilungs Leiter: Department Head
Abwehr: Amt Auslands und Abwehr
ALIU: Art Looting Investigation Unit.
Angriff : Der Angriff (Newspaper founded by Nazy Party)
AO: Auslandsorganisation (Abroad organization)
BDM: Bund Deutscher Mädel
BOE: Boletín Oficial del Estado
Brigada Social: Brigada de Investigación Social (BSI) or Brigada Político-Social (BPS)
c/o: Care of
CI-IIR: Counter-intelligence Intermediate Interrogation Report
CIR: Counter-intelligence report
DAF: Deutsche Arbeitsfront
Deutscher Schulverein: German School Association
Deutscher Verein: German Club
DGS (Spanish): Direccion General de Seguridad
DOB: Date of Birth
Falange: Falange Española (FE)
fnu: First name unknown.
G-2: U.S. Army Intelligence
Gauleiter: Head of a Gau or of a Reichsgau.
Gestapo: Geheime Staatspolizei
GIS: German Intelligence Service (acronym used by British and US)
GIS: In these documents, German Intelligence Services.
Hauptamtsleiter: Department Head
HJ: Hitlerjugend, Hitler-Jugend
I-M KO: Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter Kriegsorganisation
KdM: German Sabotage Units from Kriegsmarine
Kreisleiter: County Leader
Krim O/Asst: Kriminal Ober Assistant (police official)
Krim Sek: Kriminal-Sekretaerin
Krim. Kom.: Kriminal Kommissar
MIS: Military Intelligence Service
NSDAP: Nationalsozialistiche Deutsche Arbeiter Partei
NSFK: Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps
NSV: Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt
Obertsurmbannfuehrer: (An SA and SS rank, equivalent to Lieutenant Colonel)
OCCPAC: Office, Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality
OKW: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Ortsgruppenleiter: (Local Group Leader). Nazi Party political rank and title which existed between 1930 and 1945
OSO: Office of Special Operations
OSS: Office of Strategic Services
Pol O/lnsp: Polizei Oberinspektor
RAD: Reichsarbeitsdienst (State Labour Service)
RSHA: Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Main Security Office)
SA: Sturmabteilung (German Stormtroopers)
SD: Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (Nazi security service)
SIS: In these documents, Spanish Intelligence Services.
SS H/Stuf: Schutzstaffel Hauptsturmführer
SS: Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)
Sturmbannfuehrer: (An SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major)
Sturmfuehrer: (An SA and early SS rank, equivalent to 2nd Lieutenant)
Untersturmfuehrer: junior storm leader» – an SS rank, equivalent to Second Lieutenant
USFET MIS: United States Forces European Theater Military Intelligence Service
W/T: Wireless transmitter
Wehrmacht: German Armed Forces
-National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The information about Nazi agents in Spain is dispersed among all the files and the results of the search engine are limited. So there is no guide or rule to mitigate the search: «’Begin at the beginning (Holocaust Era- Assets) and go on till you come to the end: then stop.» as the King said.
– FBI Files
– OSS / CIA declassified files under FOIA.
– National Security Archive.
– National Archives, Kew. Many original files have been «sanitized», but is posible find the original and more extended version in NARA. Notwithstanding these archives have better information about agents in Tangier and North Africa.
– Getty Provenance Research Data Bases.
–Digital Archive. Wilson Center.
– Immigration Records of Argentina (online)
– Hemeroteca of ABC and La Vanguardia. There is no hidden nazi who could resist the temptation of announce his engagements, marriages, medals or death in the local press.
God bless the human vanity. In the years prior to WWII the section of announces were used by GIS to transmit messages in code.
Autor: Eliah Meyer
Para leer y descargar completo desde Archive.org: «THE FACTUAL LIST OF NAZIS PROTECTED BY SPAIN».pdf
Idioma: inglés; 559 páginas. Con licencia creative commons, permiso de copia y reprodución libres, sin fines comerciales, siempre y cuando se transmita en las mismas condiciones.
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Imagen de portada: pintada: «Semos Downs, pero arios.»
Publicado el 15/04/2014 14:52. en Gatopardo.blogia.com, blog cerrado sin mandato judicial por Roberto Abizanda, administrador de blogia.com. Artículo archivado en Web.archive.org